Abstract: Augustine's influence on medieval Latin theology is thoroughly known.
his abbot, Iakobos Trikanas, accused him of heresy, and a synod was convened in spring 1368, at which he was condemned. 4 He died not long after. The views of which Prochoros Kydones was accused and condemned were his subscription to syllogistics as a theological method and his conclusion, reached by this method, that the divine light, or 'Thabor light' (cf. Mt 17:2), a central concept of Hesychast soteriology, was not uncreated, but created. They were set out in his works 'On Essence and Energy ', 5 Book VI of which is on the 'Thabor light' (VI.2 is headed 'that the light on Mount Thabor is created'), and his 'Refutation of the abuse of quotations [sc. of Church Fathers] in the tomos against the Metropolitan of Ephesus and Gregoras ', 6 which contains a section on syllogisms. 7 Parts of the latter were read out at the synod of 1368. 8 It has long been recognised that Prochoros Kydones was not motivated by a rationalist, a-or even anti-spiritual attitude towards theology, but by a genuine commitment to orthodox, patristic, tradition, which compelled him to study the sources and analyse them critically, 'discern' them, before following a particular spiritual path, or subscribing to particular soteriological views and expectations. His 'criticism' was not born of 'an unfettered search for an indefinite truth', but 'grounded deeply in the heritage' of his home culture. 9 And it included not only dialectics and syllogistics, but also Latin philology. Like his brother Demetrios, Prochoros Kydones translated patristic Latin, in particular Augustinian, texts in order to use them to inform the current debate. 10 Demetrios, who as an imperial civil servant, had learned Latin from a Spanish mendicant, famously translated Thomas Aquinas' Summa contra gentiles, completing it in 1354, and later the Summa theologica, though only in part. S.th. III a was translated by Prochoros.
11 3 Compare F. Tinnefeld, Demetrios Kydones, Briefe I/1 (Stuttgart 1981) 238. 4 For the tomos of the synod see Tomus Synodicus II ; also J. Darrouzès, Regestes des actes du patriarchat de Constantinople I/5. Les regestes de 1310 -1376 (Paris 1977 ) 454-458 (nn. 2509 , 2518 , 2533 , 2541 The publication of the editio princeps of Maximos Planudes' translation of De trinitate in 1995 23 initiated to some extent a re-writing of this long history during the past decade. Since then not only the more overt influence of Augustine on his translators and adherents, but also an at least potential, more covert, influence on those using those translations, who would not necessarily have wanted to appear as adherents of Augustinian thought, like Gregory Palamas, could be explored, as was done by Reinhard Flogaus and, perhaps more critically, Jean Lison. 24 It is in the wake of recent studies such as these that one may today ask to what extent, if Palamas was himself influenced by Augustine, someone like Prochoros Kydones, who had clearly grown up in a Palamite and Hesychast environment, represented less a radical departure from Palamite Hesychasm than a form of it that was more explicitely influenced by Augustinian or classical patristic thought than the more orthodox party would allow for. Since it is the latter which is normally identified with Palamism, it may be thought inappropriate to call Prochoros' anti-Palamism a kind of 'Palamism'. But the fact remains that Prochoros has a Hesychast history or background and his concerns remained those of his Hesychast colleagues, even though after the publication of his critical works they accused him of heresy and condemned and disowned him. It is his closeness to them that appears fascinating, not so much his apparent departure from them. This article aims to illustrate this. How did Prochoros remain true to his tradition while making use of the influences which he appropriated through the study of western theology and in particular the translation of texts of Augustine.
We already indicated that for Prochoros Kydones and his brother Demetrios Augustine was not prima facie the most interesting theologian. Thomas Aquinas was. He would have appeared far more modern, contemporary, and applicable to them. Prochoros' main opus, 'On substance and energy', was in large parts a compilation of arguments drawn from the Summa contra gentiles, the Summa theologica and De potentia.
25 Nevertheless, Demetrios had also translated the Liber Sententiarum Sancti Augustini compiled by Prosper Tiro and parts from Contra Iulianum and In Iohannis evangelium tractatus. And Prochoros, in his treatise 'On the kataphatic and apophatic method in theology and the theophany of the Lord on the mountain', did not cite any Thomas Aquinas, but only Greek Patristic sources and Augustine, Ambrose and Pope Leo the Great.
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Thus Prochoros applied the scholastic method (i. e. dialectics and syllogistics) as well as the patristic argument (i. e.from authority and tradition). He perceived no conflict between medieval scholasticism and scholarship based on sources (as promoted by Renaissance humanists). For him both went hand in hand: Scholasticism improved method and style in rational argument, study of the fathers histori- cal and philological knowledge. In Prochoros Kydones we can witness both. He advocates syllogisms and proves to be an excellent philologist. He loves to argue, but he also wants his argument to be based on proper textual study. At the synod of 1368 both were at stake. Prochoros was accused of denying some of the most basic tenets of Hesychasm, the most basic one perhaps that the mystic light which one can attain in contemplation and which is the light of which the Gospels speak in the story of the Transfiguration, is uncreated, i. e. God himself, in form of his energy, as distinct from his substance, or essence (ousia). Hesychasts thought to be able to sustain this position of having a real distinction in God rather than pure, actual, simplicity, by distinguishing an ever transcendent, unapproachable side of God, and an approachable one, analogous to the sun and his rays; and they could underpin this position from tradition. Those however who were increasingly influenced by the kind of Platonist-Aristotelian thought that came in via the scholastic method and the study of conventional and especially western Patristics, like Augustine, began to reject this teaching, and Prochoros certainly was one of them. It took him sixteen years after the canonisation of Hesychasm at the synod of 1351 to make his criticism public. His main work, 'On Substance and Energy', dates from 1367, and his works on syllogisms and on the kataphatic and the apophatic method in connection with the Transfiguration must have appeared not long after. They are both cited at the synod of 1368. 27 But not only his dialectics and syllogistics were cited at the synod. His use of the patristic argument and in particular Augustine also played a role. The synod, apparently aware of Augustine's authority and perhaps also of the importance of Planudes' translation of De trinitate, does not attack Augustine, but Prochoros' use (or, in the synod's view, abuse) of him:
'And ostensibly,' it says, δ θεν, 'he [Prochoros] calls Augustine as a witness purporting to show that in one of his writings that Father of the Church says that when the good and the evil will see (,ψονται) the judge of the living and the dead, then undoubtedly the evil too will not be able to see him in any other way. They will not see him in the form (κατF τKν µορφKν) according to which he is the son of man but in the glory (ν τ δOξ ) that reveals him as judge, not in the humility (ν τ ταπειν σει) of someone who is judged.' 28 Clearly, if the glory revealed in the last judgment is the same as that revealed in the transfiguration, and uncreated, and only accessible to those who attain it in a beatific vision, it cannot be that the wicked 'see' it in the same way, since that would mean that the wicked, too, are saved. That this is the background of this charge seems clear from a statement immediately following the one just cited:
'Asked how he understands (νοε ) that [expression] "the glory of his glory" (sc. in the expression "Glory lies in his glory", ν τ δOξ α2το δOξα) Prochoros answered: "As that of the only-begotten Son of the Father, which he has together with the Father and the Spirit in regard to creation, that which has become, and that which also shows itself 27 See above nn. The Augustine reference to which the Synod refers in the passage cited earlier could be from De Trinitate (1.3.30), which Prochoros cites in Book IV of his 'On Substance and Energy'. Interestingly, he uses Planudes' translation, omitting only a few phrases. He writes:
'For the same reason Augustine teaches that "it is characteristic of the true believers (τ ν ε2σεβ ν "διων) to hear the message of Christ's incarnation in such a way that they believe in it on the ground that he is equal to the Father in the form of God (ν µορφ το θεο ). Equally true is that which follows from this, as the one who holds it firmly proclaims: »As the father has life in himself, he gives life to the Son to have it in himself« (Jn 5:26)." Then he continues to deal with the vision of Christ's glory in which he will come as judge, which will be common to the wicked as well as the just.' 30 The passage in De trinitate is a commentary on Jn 5:24-27. It goes as follows (the lemma is cited in square brackets; it does not appear in the source):
[Jn 5:24: 'He who listens to my word and believes in him who sent me has eternal life'] Augustine: 'This eternal life is that sight in which the wicked have no part … And this applies only to loyal believers who believe him to be equal to the Father in the form of God … Then [following Jn 5:27: 'And he also gave him authority to do judgment.'] he comes to the sight of his splendour in which he will come to judge, a sight that will be shared by the wicked and the just alike … Yes, even the wicked will be given a sight of the Son of Man: a sight of the form of God will be granted only to "the pure of heart, because they shall see God" (Matth. 5:8).' 31 This is quite subtle and can be spun in more than one way. On the one hand, Augustine himself has to qualify his understanding of 'seeing God', because it is traditionally identified with 'being saved'. The biblical proof text is Matth 5:8. If we talk of the wicked seeing God in the context of the last judgment, we have to qualify this, or, as the Hesychasts suggest, stop talking of the wicked seeing God. On the other hand, the Thabor light, or the concept of God's visible glory, as the Hesychast view would have it, is here, according to Augustine, not the ideal place in which to locate that eternal light the sight of which means salvation. This kind of light, of which after all the Gospel itself speaks, belongs to the category which also the wicked can see. That (other) light, of which we speak in connection with the salvation, is transcendent, i. e. it lies beyond our physical vision and beyond immanent, historical, occurrences like the transfiguration or the last judgment.
Prochoros, too, makes this distinction, when he adds to the passage cited n. 28: 'What has to be added, of course, is that, obviously, the wicked will not see the form ( µορφK) of the son according to which he is equal to the Father. ' it is reiterated 'that God is not seen in a place, but with a pure heart, and he is not sought with bodily eyes and not countenanced by physical sight nor touched with the sense of touch, or heard with ears, or sensed as in a physical approach.' On the other hand: 'It is due to our manner of speaking that we call bodies, physical objects, visible, and this is why we call God invisible: that we do not succumb to the belief that God has a body, not because we want to cheat pure hearts out of their contemplation of his substance.' Thus it makes sense for Augustine to speak of 'seeing God', but not in a physical sense, since God has no physical substance.
'Of course, there are those,' Augustine continues, 'who hold that God himself is body [i. e. the principle of every body, body as such, omnino], because they believe that whatever is no body, cannot be a substance. But they must be refuted,' Augustine says. And there are others who do not believe that God is substantially body, but believe that when they are going to rise from the dead, they are going to see God in a spiritual body which they imagine to be a kind of image of the physical body. And what about that spiritual body which according to Phil 3:21 transfigurates our humble body to conform with the body of his glory, the µορφK of his δOξα, of which we heard earlier? In view of this, Augustine says, Scripture speaks of the Father seeing the son and the son seeing the father. As a consequence 'seeing' cannot only refer to a physical process. Gen 1:31 speaks of God 'seeing everything' ('and it was very good').
In short, Augustine distinguishes between a physical and a spiritual, or nonphysical, vision, and does not accept the former as a form of beatific vision. Prochoros follows him in that and also develops the epistemological basis for arguing the case in his work on 'On the kataphatic and apophatic method in theology and on the theophany of the Lord on the Holy Mountain'. In it Prochoros criticises the Hesychast claim to offer a new form of kataphatic theology, which on the ground of uncreated energies no longer relies on metaphorical, or analogous, names for God, but has access to univocally appropriate names, as if revealed directly to the initiate in a private revelation. For Prochoros this went against the traditional differentiation between subject and object, that which signifies and that which is signified, νοητK, or συµβολικK, and νοητF. Prochoros refutes the ontological as well as the epistemological assumptions behind the idea of uncreated energies and argues that the kataphatic like the anaphatic way relies solely on created things, for it proceeds, in analogy, from an image or likeness to the original. The apophatic way in contrast is simple and without further presupposition (πλ , ναMτιος). In and by itself it expresses a deeper knowledge and experience of God and it is only because of the way we are created, as beings with bodies in time and space, that it relies on a composite, or synthetic, and also causal (σ νθετος, ατιατK) equivalent, which formulates statements about God based on our phyiscal experiences. There is no way that these two methods can be detached from each other, because, ultimately, we do not have a direct knowledge of the reality of God as such (τM ε$ναι). In § 2 Prochoros translates sapientes as φιλOσοφοι. In § 1 he had translated sapientes as ο σοφο. But there he had also noticed Augustine's explanation that among the ancients 'the wise' (sapientes, σοφο) liked to be called 'would-be-wise' (philosophi, φιλOσοφοι), people who would like to be wise, which can be taken seriously, as a compliment, or as an ironic remark, as it might have been intended by Augustine. In any case, a sentence later Prochoros can use the two expressions synonymously. In § 8 a further aspect is added on to this. There Augustine argues that philosophy and religion, quest for wisdom and worship of God, are one and the same thing. Now here Prochoros adds 'among us' (παρ' µ ν), by which he probably means 'us Christians'. Augustine implies this, but he does not express it. Prochoros however gives the impression that for him, in his situation, philosophy is something quite specific, namely the monastic life in the Laura. 35 Thus his addition παρ' µ ν in § 8 and his identification of 'the wise' and 'philosophers' in § 1 and 2 assume a very special meaning. And there are further details which could hint at the asceticmonastic context of Prochoros' translation.
In § 5 Prochoros translates divitiis as τ ν ψυχικ ν καL τ ν σωµατικ ν παθ ν. In § 10 ascetic passages are expanded and almost paraphrased. Ad admonitionem nostrae diligentiae becomes νουθετKµατα πρNς τN γενIσθαι προσεκτικωτIρους µ ς καθιστGµενοι, ad exercitationem nostrae patientiae πρNς τN γυµνGζεσθαι τJν µ ν καρτερεMαν. Patientia is a general human virtue, καρτερεMα (or καρτερMα) however the kind of patience which is exercised, in the context of a life long commitment, by ascetics or monks.
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In § 2 Augustine wrote that even Socrates worshipped idols alongside the common people. Prochoros adds to this καL ΠλGτων. This does not change the general thrust of the basic argument that the ancient philosophers despite the advanced nature of their teachings failed to distance themselves from popular ancient polytheism. But there is a slight shift as far as history of philosophy is concerned. It is possible that Augustine would have found it easier to place Socrates in a context of pagan folk tradition than the venerable figure of Plato, while for Prochoros the difference had become far less significant. In § 3 Prochoros translates animum ad intuendam as τN τ ς ψυχ ς ,µµα πρNς τN θεωρε ν. It seems that Prochoros saw animus as the faculty of the soul (anima, ψυχK) to attain the beatific (intellectual) vision. It was one of Prochoros' main motifs to introduce Augustine to Greek orthodoxy as a platonising church father, similar to Gregory of Nazianzus or Basil the Great. It was this what lay behind his translation programme. One of the central theological-spiritual concepts of his project was that of a beatific intellectual vision.
37 Vera rel. contains a programme of a fides quaerens intellectum, faith seeking understanding. This is what fascinated Prochoros, far more than the first traces of a doctrine of grace becoming visible for the first time in vera rel., with its problematic rendering of the relationship between grace and free will. Against this background it becomes clear why Prochoros in § 6 should translate the Latin expression fidem voluntatemque as πMστιν, and nothing else. The Augustinian concept of voluntas, vital in this context for Augustine, was not of interest to him. One could even ask which Greek expression should have rendered voluntas in this context. 38 Prochoros uses πMστις also for religio, e. g. at the beginning of § 8, where the text speaks of the absence of religio among the pagan philosophers who participated in the cults despite their misgivings about them. Further on in § 8 Prochoros renders religio as θρησκεMα. The same expression can be found in Vat. Gr. 1096 in the title of the work: De vera religione, περL τ ς ληθο ς θρησκεMας. In § 9 religio is translated as ε2σIβεια. This means that Prochoros seems to have had a less clear cut concept of religio than Augustine, who in vera rel. had tried precisely to specify religio as something more than simply worship, or piety. However, this is not to say that Prochoros did not have an idea of the difference. Note the use of expressions for religion in the following statement recorded in the tomos of the Synod of 1368, which is coined against the Palamites (PG 151:701): ε µHν γFρ ξ ποκαλ ψεως τJν πMστιν ε"χοµεν, Aσπερ ο τ ς ε2σεβεMας τα της γεµOνες ... πεL δε καL φ µ ς &ουδαικJ ρG, καL σκοτMσθησαν ο (φθαλµοL µ ν το µJ βλIπειν, καL σκοποL µHν τυφλοM... ('for if, of course, we had our faith from personal revelation, as the leaders of that religion ..., then we too would be smitten by the Jewish curse, and our eyes would be darkened, we could not see, and (over-)seers ((πι-) σκοποM) would be blind...).
To conclude, therefore, all of these writings, his dialectic works and works on syllogisms, and his translations from works of Augustine, appeal to the kind of intellectual and scholastic Hesychasm for which Prochoros stands. Having lived as a monk in the Great Lavra on Mount Athos since his youth he had believed in salvation as an ultimate form of illumination, a revelation of truth in every sense of the word. Revelation, so he continued to believe, reveals to man a Logos who leads him on to search the truth with some scope of success: µ ν πρNς ε7ρεσιν τ ς ληθεMας λOγος τ ποκαλ ψει δεικνυµIνος. In fact, Prochoros' kind of, or attitude to, Hesychasm was in a certain sense a radicalised one, for it comprised not only the physical and moral, but also the intellectual sphere. Rather than labelling him an anti-Palamite in the sense that one would label, say, a Scotist an anti-Augustinian, one might call him an intellectualist, as opposed to the somewhat anti-intellectual voluntarism of orthodox Palamism. His main work carries the title 'On substance (ο2σMα) and energy (νIργεια)', ΠερL ο2σMας καL νIργειας, and in further treatises he argues for syllogistics as necessary tools for any theology as a reflection on one's spiritual experience and for the distinction between one's own, limited, physical, experience as created and the uncreated truth of God himself. One very basic and (to the Palamites) infuriating argument was that no matter what we do, whenever we express ourselves we do so assuming that our partners in dialogue understand what we say on the basis of the principles of logic (or that part of logic that pertains to the use of ordinary language, called syllogistics, which is largely based on the principle of non-contradiction) and human understanding. All Prochoros wanted to do was to use syllogistics and textual study to deepen the understanding of his spiritual path. Tellingly, he was not accused of refuting Hesychasm comprehensively. Only certain key ideas were picked out and held against him, like the denial of the uncreatedness of the light of Thabor. Finally, his use of translations for theological argument explains why he translated only certain texts, or only parts of them, and if we look in detail, we discover some of his theological ideas in these translations. Herbert Hunger's contribution to the understanding of Prochoros' theological thinking by publishing his translations of works of Augustine can thus hardly be overestimated. Needless to say, there is a lot more work to be done. By far not all of Prochoros' works and translations have been published and the whole oeuvre still awaits serious study. The present article can only scratch the surface in that respect, but perhaps a few glimpses have been allowed into the fascinating mind of this 14 th century figure.
